Europe’s initial response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was one of remarkable unity. In 2022, outraged publics and resolute leaders moved in lockstep – imposing sanctions, arming Kyiv, even fast-tracking EU candidate status for Ukraine. Nearly two years on, that solidarity is being tested by a surge of Euroscepticism across the continent. From Rome to Berlin to Paris, doubts are creeping in about the costs and consequences of unwavering support for Ukraine. Can Europe maintain its resolve to defend Ukraine as domestic discontent and political divides grow? This question looms large as the war grinds on and European capitals grapple with war fatigue.
Rising Euroscepticism in Key States
In Italy, Germany, and France, populist and Eurosceptic forces have gained ground, often questioning the EU’s stance on Russia’s war. Italy’s government, led by Giorgia Meloni, is an interesting paradox. Meloni is a nationalist Euroskeptic by pedigree, yet she has been hawkish in backing Ukraine – a stance she maintains even though Italian public opinion is relatively lukewarm about supporting Kyiv. Surveys show Italians are less enthusiastic than other large EU nations when it comes to sending weapons or sanctioning Moscow. Meloni’s coalition partners, however, include figures with openly pro-Putin histories (Matteo Salvini once called Putin “the best statesman in the world”). So far Meloni has kept Italy on a pro-Ukraine line, but her country’s stance is fragile beneath the surface (Meloni’s support for Ukraine is good political strategy – New Statesman). Should economic pain deepen or a new leader take office, Italy could waver.
In Germany, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s centrist coalition rolled out a historic “Zeitenwende” shift, boosting defense spending and aiding Ukraine after initial hesitation. Yet far-right Eurosceptics are surging: the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) now polls as the second-most popular party. The AfD and some on the far-left have seized on public anxieties – from high energy prices to fear of escalation – to argue against Berlin’s Ukraine policy. They portray sanctions and arms deliveries as self-destructive for Germans. While the German government remains committed to Kyiv, it faces a vocal minority in the streets and Bundestag calling for a more Russia-accommodating approach. In France, President Emmanuel Macron has championed European support for Ukraine, even as he keeps channels open to Moscow. But Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, a party with a long Euroskeptic, pro-Kremlin streak, is topping polls in France. Le Pen (who once took a campaign loan from a Russian bank) officially condemns Putin’s invasion today, yet she argues against heavy weapons for Ukraine and harsh sanctions that hit French wallets. The far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon similarly opposes military aid. Thus, in France as in Germany and Italy, mainstream leaders are under pressure from populists exploiting war fatigue and economic stress at home.
Other EU members are not immune either. Hungary’s nationalist government under Viktor Orbán stands out as the loudest dissenting voice in Europe’s chorus. Orbán has openly criticized EU sanctions and vetoed collective aid packages for Ukraine, effectively holding EU unity hostage to his domestic agenda. He has demanded Brussels release funds earmarked for Hungary (frozen over rule-of-law concerns) in exchange for his support on Ukraine aid – a stark linkage of unrelated issues that infuriates other Europeans. In Slovakia, a newly elected populist leadership has signaled reluctance to continue arms deliveries to Ukraine, marking a turn from the previous government’s strong support. Even Poland, one of Ukraine’s staunchest backers, briefly saw tensions flare in 2023 over grain imports, as domestic farming interests pushed Warsaw to take a harder line toward Kyiv. Across the continent, Eurosceptic and nationalist politicians are amplifying grievances – be it economic woes or migration – to argue that Brussels should prioritize “our own people” over Ukraine.
A Continent Split Over Russia and Ukraine
These political rumblings reflect a deeper divide in European public opinion on the war. Broadly, Europeans agree that Russia is to blame for the conflict, but they differ on how to end it. A striking split has emerged between those who want peace quickly and those who insist on justice for Ukraine. One recent pan-European poll described a “Peace camp” (often larger in Southern and Western Europe) that favors an immediate ceasefire even if Ukraine must cede territory, versus a “Justice camp” (strong in Eastern Europe) that believes lasting peace only comes from Russia’s clear defeat. In nearly every country surveyed (except frontline Poland), the peace-now sentiment outweighed the win-at-all-costs view. Europeans worry about the cost of a long war and the dangers of escalation, including nuclear risks. This helps explain why public support for an open-ended conflict is lukewarm, especially in countries like Italy and Germany that once prided themselves on being “Russlandverstehers” – “Russia-understanders” – inclined to engage Moscow.
Today, after countless sanctions and arms shipments, many Europeans are asking how and when this war will end. Only about 1 in 10 Europeans believe Ukraine can outright win the war militarily, according to a 2024 multi-country survey. Majorities in key states such as Italy, Greece, and Hungary now favor pressuring Kyiv into a negotiated settlement with Russia – a position at odds with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s refusal to cede Ukrainian land. Overall European support for Ukraine remains solid, but it is not unconditional: roughly one-third of EU citizens say the EU should limit support to Ukraine, though a modest majority still backs continuing aid. This public skepticism exerts a gravitational pull-on politician, especially as elections approach. We see it in Macron’s and Scholz’s careful messaging about wanting Ukraine to win “for Europe’s sake” but also hinting at eventual diplomacy. We see it when leaders like Macron and Meloni, usually pro-Ukraine, insist that any new aid for Kyiv be packaged with measures addressing domestic priorities (for example, more EU funds for migration or energy). They know voters need to see that European governments haven’t forgotten problems at home.
Domestic politics thus tugs at foreign policy. Each weapons shipment or sanctions round is weighed against public opinion and party interests. Policy splits have emerged within and between countries: Eastern EU members (Poland, Baltic states) demand maximalist support to defeat Russia, while some Western and Southern partners quietly contemplate off-ramps if the war drags on. The unity in EU statements – “for as long as it takes” – masks behind-the-scenes debates over strategy. Should Europe double down on military aid for a Ukrainian victory, or encourage mediation and a freeze in fighting? These questions hang in the air. Moscow, for its part, feeds this uncertainty. The Kremlin amplifies European voices of dissent via propaganda and delights in every sign of wavering. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently crowed that the West is “having real difficulty finding extra money to continue supporting Zelensky’s regime”, seizing on the narrative of Ukraine fatigue in the EU and U.S. Even if that is more wishful thinking than reality, it underscores how European disunity is a strategic goal for Putin. Indeed, analysts suspect Putin’s war strategy banks on outlasting the West’s willingness to stick together.
Economic and Military Strains Fuel Discontent
Underlying much of this Euroscepticism are economic and military pressures that have left many Europeans uneasy. The war’s fallout hit Europe’s economy hard. Energy prices spiked to record levels after Russia throttled gas supplies, driving eurozone inflation to its highest in decades. By late 2022, Europe’s annual inflation neared 10%, squeezing households and businesses. The result has been a wave of protests over the cost of living from Germany to Czechia to Spain. Anger at soaring fuel and food prices doesn’t always translate into opposition to helping Ukraine, but populists have been quick to blame “sanctions war” and EU policies for ordinary people’s pain. When citizens struggle to pay bills, promises of solidarity with Kyiv can sound abstract. Governing parties know this, and fear a voter backlash if they are seen as prioritizing Ukraine over domestic woes. As global instability pushes up prices, Europe’s leaders walk a tightrope: sanction Russia (to weaken Putin’s war machine) just enough to uphold principles, but not so much that their own people riot over utility bills.
Then there is the matter of defense and security costs. Europe’s military support to Ukraine – from modern tanks to air defenses – has been robust, but it’s also depleting national arsenals and budgets. Countries that once underinvested in defense are now racing to rearm both Ukraine and themselves. Defense spending is rising across Europe, which brings its own political friction. Many Europeans support helping Ukraine defend itself, but they are less enthusiastic about paying more for their own militaries. In fact, outside of a few countries (Poland, Finland, Sweden – all uniquely wary of Russia), most European publics are not eager to boost military budgets significantly. Governments have had to tap emergency funds and launch special budgets (Germany’s €100 billion defense fund, for example) to finance both aid to Ukraine and overdue upgrades to their forces. This money doesn’t come out of thin air – it’s ultimately taxpayer funds that might otherwise go to social programs, healthcare, or post-Covid recovery. High inflation and strained public finances make these trade-offs harder to manage. Every euro spent on tanks or howitzers for Ukraine is scrutinized by opposition parties: could it have been spent at home on pensions or schools? So far, mainstream European leaders have largely convinced their populations that supporting Ukraine is worth the sacrifice. But as the war grinds into its third year, the question of “how much longer, at what price?” grows louder.
Meanwhile, Europe faces the practical challenge of sustaining military aid. Stockpiles of ammunition and equipment, initially ample, have been drawn down. European arms manufacturers are ramping up production, but there are bottlenecks and delays in getting promised aid out the door. For instance, EU countries agreed to jointly procure artillery shells for Ukraine, yet deliveries have lagged behind battlefield needs. Such hiccups can fuel public skepticism – if the war effort appears stalled or ineffective despite massive support, people begin to doubt the point of continued sacrifices. And looming in the background is uncertainty about the United States. Washington has been the arsenal and financial lifeline for Ukraine, but if American support falters (as some in Europe fear, especially with U.S. elections on the horizon), Europeans know they would be asked to dig even deeper into their own pockets. In an ECFR survey, only 20% of Europeans said the EU should significantly increase support to compensate for a potential U.S. pullback. In other words, enthusiasm for writing an ever-bigger check is limited. Europe’s commitment, while strong, has clearer limits than wartime rhetoric might suggest.
Can Europe Stay United for Ukraine?
With such headwinds, can Europe remain united in backing Ukraine? The answer is a qualified yes – Europe can, but it won’t be easy. Unity will require constant political maintenance. European leaders must do more than rest on lofty statements of solidarity; they need to tend to their citizens’ concerns even as they bolster Ukraine. That means clearly communicating why supporting Ukraine is vital for Europe’s own security and values. As European Parliament President Roberta Metsola told President Zelensky, “we have your back… we will be with you for as long as it takes”. To make good on that promise, leaders have to convince ordinary Europeans that “as long as it takes” is not just about helping Ukraine, but about defending Europe’s peace and principles. They must also show that they are addressing the side-effects of the war: by shielding vulnerable households from inflation, investing in energy security to escape Russian gas blackmail, and sharing the burden of refugee support across the EU. Such measures can blunt the appeal of populists who claim resources spent on Ukraine are stolen from citizens at home.
European nations have managed to preserve a surprising level of unity so far – far more than Putin banked on, given the EU’s fractious history . Even with vocal opposition from the fringes, every EU member (bar Hungary) has continued to endorse sanctions and most have contributed military aid. NATO, bolstered by new members Finland and Sweden, stands firm. These are signs that Europe’s core commitment is holding. Moreover, countries once ambivalent about confronting Moscow have shifted. Germany abandoned decades of pacifism to arm Ukraine; Sweden and Finland gave up neutrality to join NATO; the EU is even funding weapons deliveries – unheard of before this war. Such shifts suggest a deep recognition that Russian aggression threatens all of Europe, not just Ukraine. This recognition can be the glue that holds European unity together when domestic politics get tricky.
That said, Europe’s unity may become more flexible than monolithic. We might see a two-speed support effort: a coalition of the willing (Poland, Nordics, Baltics, plus willing Western nations like the UK, Germany, etc.) driving military aid forward, while more hesitant states contribute less but do not obstruct the overall effort. Indeed, EU decision-making allows for ad-hoc arrangements if unanimity is lacking – as seen when Hungary’s veto threat over EU funds forced others to consider alternative mechanisms. Europe may have to increasingly rely on creative diplomacy to keep all 27 members on board, offering side deals or concessions (as with Orbán) to prevent a breakdown in consensus. Unity does not mean every country doing exactly the same thing, but rather moving in the same direction. On that front, there are encouraging signs: even skeptical leaders like Italy’s Meloni and France’s Macron ultimately reiterate that Russia cannot be allowed to win, albeit in their own tones.
A Fragile Commitment, But a Vital One
European unity for Ukraine is not guaranteed, but it is not doomed either. The coming months will likely bring more tests: elections that could empower Euroskeptics, economic slowdowns that fuel dissatisfaction, and difficult calls on military support (tanks and jets today, perhaps security guarantees or reconstruction aid tomorrow). Europe’s challenge will be to navigate these internal divisions without losing sight of the bigger picture. The bigger picture is that a secure and sovereign Ukraine is critical to Europe’s own stability. If Russian revanchism goes unchecked in Ukraine, no EU state on Russia’s border will feel safe, and the rules-based order in Europe would suffer a grievous blow. That is the argument Europe’s leaders must keep making to their people.
Despite the noise of Euroscepticism, a quiet majority of Europeans still agrees with supporting Ukraine’s defense of freedom. That consensus might not be flashy, but it is powerful. It has weathered inflation and energy crises, and it can endure if carefully sustained. Europe can defend Ukraine and remain united – but only if it addresses the legitimate worries of its citizens even as it stands up to Moscow’s aggression. In the end, Europe’s ability to stay the course in Ukraine will hinge on political will and prudent leadership. The road ahead is fraught with “Ukraine fatigue” and populist temptations, yet a collapse of support is not inevitable. European unity may bend under strain, but if leaders continue to balance domestic needs with strategic resolve, it need not break. The stakes – for Ukraine’s survival and Europe’s own peace – are simply too high to allow internal rifts to derail the commitment. In this era of geopolitical trial, Europe’s resolve will remain under the microscope. The realist outlook? Europe is likely to soldier on in support of Ukraine, albeit with more cracks in the facade and more compromise required – a unity that is imperfect but ultimately unbroken in the face of Russia’s challenge.
