Indonesia and the BRICS
As the first ASEAN nation to join this intergovernmental bloc primarily composed of states from the Global South, Indonesia’s entry into BRICS marks a significant shift in its foreign policy. This decision, spearheaded by Prabowo Subianto’s leadership, represents a departure from previous administrations and a potential turning point in the country’s traditional geopolitical posture. The free and active diplomatic doctrine, conceived by Mohammad Hatta in the 1950s, which has long guided Indonesia’s foreign policy, appears to have been redefined, if not outright challenged, to adapt to a global context increasingly characterised by a return to international bipolarity between the US and China, where alliances are becoming pivotal.
Does this choice redefine the country’s neutrality? Historically, Indonesia has sought to maintain a neutral stance, fostering cooperation and dialogue with the Global North and Global South. This approach was particularly evident during the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), who adopted the policy of “zero enemies and a thousand friends,” and was partially continued by Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose pragmatic focus centred on domestic economic development and infrastructure. However, joining BRICS has raised questions about Indonesia’s geopolitical alignment, particularly in relation to the United States and other Western allies.
In multiple statements, President Prabowo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have emphasized that Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS does not contradict its free and active diplomatic doctrine. However, in international politics, such statements must be considered part of a broader ideological construct that obscures deeper global power structures. The non-alignment rhetoric may legitimize Indonesia’s elite-driven foreign policy while entrenching new forms of dependency within the Global South.
Indonesia’s BRICs membership must be understood within the bloc’s internal complexities.. Despite its anti-hegemonic discourse, BRICS remains a space where dominant actors, particularly China and Russia, exercise significant influence. Indonesia’s claim of strategic autonomy within BRICS must be scrutinized against the material and institutional constraints shaping global governance. While the official rhetoric seeks to reassure all sides, the extent to which Indonesia can maintain true non-alignment within a bloc that often positions itself as an alternative to the US-led global order remains uncertain. Diplomatic statements do not always translate into actual policy, and Indonesia may find itself increasingly drawn into the strategic interests of dominant BRICS members.
Indonesia and China
Indonesia’s relationship with China is distinct from its BRICS membership, shaped by longstanding economic and security engagements. While China and Indonesia have had strong economic relations, problems may be more pronounced for the United States. Rather than signaling a shift towards bloc politics, Indonesia’s move can be interpreted as an effort to expand its diplomatic space and economic opportunities. BRICS membership offers Indonesia greater access to alternative financial mechanisms and development funds, which align with its domestic economic agenda. However, such economic incentives do not occur in a vacuum; they are shaped by structural power relations that often favor stronger economies within the bloc. Dependency on Chinese capital and BRICS-led financial institutions may replicate, rather than subvert, the global hierarchies Indonesia seeks to escape.
Indonesia, ASEAN, and BRICS
The second key point concerns the implications for ASEAN and whether this move will signal the end of ASEAN centrality, challenging the idea of a centre in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Indonesia’s choice to join BRICS raises essential questions about the future of ASEAN, relies on internal consensus and non-interference to maintain a united position vis-à-vis global powers. However, Indonesia’s affiliation with an extra-regional bloc could weaken this cohesion. The perception of an Indonesia increasingly aligned with China could foster distrust among other ASEAN members, many of whom maintain strained relations with Beijing, particularly concerning disputes in the South China Sea, involving countries like the Philippines and Malaysia. At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that ASEAN already maintains strong economic with China and India, nevertheless, while these agreements demonstrate ASEAN’s economic pragmatism, they do not necessarily translate into geopolitical alignment. Economic interdependence does not eliminate security concerns, as seen in the South China Sea disputes. Indonesia’s move to BRICS could still be perceived as a shift from ASEAN-centric multilateralism toward a more global South-oriented alignment, raising questions about whether ASEAN can maintain its traditional consensus-driven approach in the face of Indonesia’s evolving foreign policy priorities.
While ASEAN centrality has faced challenges in the past, Indonesia’s BRICS membership could intensify these pressures by shifting its diplomatic and economic engagements toward an extra-regional bloc. In this context, Indonesia risks transitioning from a regional leader to an actor perceived as overly subordinate to the interests of external powers, particularly China. Such dependence could undermine Indonesia’s ability to act independently and maintain its role as a neutral actor. President Prabowo has emphasized that Indonesia’s BRICS membership does not contradict ASEAN centrality but rather enhances Indonesia’s role in global governance. However, the extent to which this aligns with ASEAN’s collective vision remains uncertain. If Indonesia’s strategic priorities begin to diverge from those of other ASEAN members, it could weaken regional unity, with broader implications for Southeast Asia’s stability and its ability to engage effectively with major global powers.
This shift could redefine Indonesia’s role within ASEAN and vis-à-vis extra-regional powers. Also, BRICS membership and MoUs moved Indonesia from a transactional economic engagement with China to a deeper political-security relationship. Beijing, alongside Moscow, represents the bloc’s driving force, and the growing proximity between Jakarta and Beijing risks altering Indonesia’s image as an equidistant power. Prabowo’s visit to Beijing, during which memorandums of understanding were signed that appear to overlap with ASEAN regulations on maritime disputes, underscores this trend. This rapprochement with China can be interpreted as a form of structural dependence that risks replicating, in a new context, the same dynamics of economic and geopolitical subordination that Indonesia had sought to avoid concerning the Global North. Though powerful in symbolic terms, the Global South’s rhetoric may thus mask the emergence of new intra-South hierarchies, with China playing a dominant role.
The economic dimension of Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS is equally significant. The bloc’s emphasis on creating alternative financial systems, such as promoting local currencies in trade settlements and reducing reliance on the US dollar, aligns with Indonesia’s long-standing efforts to enhance macroeconomic stability. Indonesia had already pursued local currency settlements with Japan and China prior to joining BRICS, indicating that this initiative is part of a broader strategy rather than a radical shift. For Jakarta, BRICS membership offers the potential for increased access to development financing, trade partnerships, and investments, particularly in critical sectors such as infrastructure and energy. However, while Indonesia-China economic ties were already strong through bilateral and regional mechanisms, BRICS introduces a new layer of institutional engagement that could deepen structural dependencies. Given Beijing’s track record of leveraging economic relationships for strategic influence, Indonesia must critically assess whether BRICS enhances its economic resilience or reinforces asymmetrical dependencies.
From a domestic perspective, joining BRICS also has implications for Indonesia’s political landscape. The decision reflects Prabowo Subianto’s vision of a more assertive and globally engaged Indonesia. By aligning with BRICS, Prabowo aims to position Indonesia as a key player in shaping the emerging the world order. This vision resonates with nationalist sentiments and the desire to reclaim Indonesia’s historical role as a leader of the Global South. However, it also raises questions about the sustainability of this vision, particularly in the face of domestic challenges such as inequality, corruption, and infrastructure gaps. For Prabowo’s foreign policy agenda to succeed, it must be underpinned by a robust domestic foundation capable of supporting Indonesia’s ambitions on the global stage.
Another dimension to consider is the impact of Indonesia’s BRICS membership on its relations with traditional partners in the Global North. While Indonesia has sought to diversify its partnerships, its decision to join a bloc critical of the Western-led international order may strain ties with countries such as the United States, Japan, and Australia. These nations have been key sources of investment, trade, and security cooperation for Indonesia. Balancing these relationships with its commitments to BRICS will require deft diplomacy. Indonesia must reassure its traditional partners that its alignment with BRICS does not signify a wholesale rejection of its ties with the Global North but rather an effort to diversify its foreign policy options in an increasingly complex world. Indonesia has long-standing economic and strategic ties with both Japan and Australia, reinforced through Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA), which provide a stable foundation for continued cooperation despite geopolitical shifts. However, economic agreements alone do not shield relationships from broader systemic rivalries. While Japan and Australia may not immediately react negatively to Indonesia’s BRICS membership, their positions as close allies of the United States mean that Indonesia’s engagement with BRICS could still introduce complexities in diplomatic alignments over time
While BRICS is officially a multilateral economic and development-oriented cooperation platform, its growing strategic influence means that it is often perceived as a counterweight to Western-led institutions. Indonesia’s ability to influence the bloc’s direction will depend on its capacity to assert itself within a group dominated by larger powers such as China and Russia. Although BRICS is not a formal geopolitical alliance, its agenda is inevitably shaped by the strategic interests of its dominant members Ensuring that BRICS remains a platform for genuine multilateral cooperation rather than a tool for the strategic ambitions of its dominant members will be a key challenge for Jakarta.
In conclusion, Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS represents a bold shift in its foreign policy, reflecting a desire to adapt to the changing dynamics of the international system. While this move offers opportunities to enhance Indonesia’s global influence and promote its interests as an emerging power, it also comes with significant risks. One key challenge is ASEAN’s centrality. Similarly, while Indonesia’s economic ties with China were already strong, BRICS provides a broader institutional framework that could deepen structural dependencies. Ultimately, Indonesia’s success in this endeavour will depend on its ability to manage the complexities of an increasingly interconnected and polarised world.
