In the evolving maritime security landscape of the Indian Ocean, India’s strategic approach must adapt to emerging challenges and opportunities. Traditionally, the Indian Navy seeks to build and maintain a fleet of three aircraft carriers — one rotated into maintenance and two active – to ensure continuous operational presence in both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal.

However, rapid advancements in naval technology and shifting geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reevaluation of this strategy. Integrating multiple Light Aircraft Carrier Groups (LACGs), modeled after Japan’s Izumo-class multipurpose operations destroyers and inspired by Turkey’s TCG Anadolu drone carrier developments, presents a compelling alternative.

The Indian Navy’s acquisition of Light Combat Aircraft Carriers (LCAGs) aligns with ongoing efforts to bolster its naval power and indigenise defence prodcutions and capabilities       . This increase in naval capability is driven by the need to counter China’s growing presence and power projection in the Indian Ocean, which is driving complex shifts in the Indo-Asia Pacific (Indo-APAC) security environment .

LCAGs offer India a cost-effective way to enhance and expand its naval power, without the high costs associated with traditional aircraft carrier battle groups. By adopting LCAGs, India can improve maritime domain awareness, ensure operational flexibility across diverse missions, and foster robust defense collaboration with key regional partners like Japan and South Korea.

Integrating LCAGs with advanced unmanned systems would further amplify India’s maritime surveillance and strike capabilities, while minimizing human risk and aligning with the evolving paradigms of modern warfare.

This approach, combined with enhanced collaboration with Japan and South Korea, provides a resource-efficient pathway for India to achieve maritime supremacy and counter the naval ambitions of regional adversaries such as China and Pakistan.

By leveraging the benefits of LCAGs and strengthening partnerships with like-minded nations, India can effectively address complex maritime security challenges in the region, while promoting stability and cooperation in the Indian Ocean. This strategic approach will enable India to maintain a strong and sustainable naval presence, while advancing its national interests and promoting regional security.

Overview of Carrier Groups

Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) are central to the naval strategies of China, the United Kingdom, the United States, and India. Each nation’s CBGs are composed of various vessels, each serving specific roles to ensure the group’s operational effectiveness.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) of China operates two active aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, with a third, Fujian, under development. A typical Chinese CBG includes:

• An aircraft carrier with a displacement of approximately 60,000 to 70,000 tons.
• 2-3 Type 055 destroyers (12,000-13,000 tons) for air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
• 2-3 Type 052D destroyers (7,500 tons) equipped for air defense and ASW.
• 2-3 Type 054A frigates (4,000 tons) focused on ASW and escort duties.
• 1-2 Type 093 nuclear attack submarines (7,000 tons) providing undersea warfare capabilities.
• 1 Type 901 fast combat support ship (45,000 tons) for logistics.

Typically, a PLAN CBG comprises the aircraft carrier, 2-3 destroyers, 2-3 frigates, 1-2 submarines, and 1 support ship, totaling approximately 7 to 10 vessels.

The Royal Navy’s carrier strike groups are centered around the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. A standard UK CBG includes

• An aircraft carrier with a displacement of about 65,000 tons, capable of carrying up to 40 aircraft.
• 1-2 Type 45 destroyers (8,500 tons) for air defense.
• 1-2 Type 23 frigates (4,900 tons) specialized in ASW.
• 1 Astute-class submarine (7,400 tons) providing stealth and strike capabilities.
• 1 Tide-class tanker (37,000 tons) responsible for replenishment at sea.

A typical Royal Navy CBG consists of the aircraft carrier, 1-2 destroyers, 1-2 frigates, 1 submarine, and 1 support ship, totaling around 5 to 7 vessels.

The United States Navy (USN) fields the largest and most advanced CBGs, each built around a Nimitz or Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. A typical U.S. CBG includes:

• An aircraft carrier with a displacement of approximately 100,000 tons, deploying an air wing of around 75 aircraft.
• 2-3 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (9,200 tons) equipped with the Aegis combat system for air and missile defense.
• 1-2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers (9,800 tons) providing air defense and command capabilities.
• 1 Los Angeles or Virginia-class submarine (6,900 tons) offering ASW and strike capabilities.
• 1-2 Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers (41,000 tons) responsible for logistical support.

Typically, a U.S. CBG comprises the aircraft carrier, 2-3 destroyers, 1-2 cruisers, 1 submarine, and 1-2 support ships, totaling approximately 7 to 9 vessels.

The Indian Navy’s carrier groups feature the INS Vikramaditya and the indigenously built INS Vikrant. A typical Indian CBG includes:

• An aircraft carrier with a displacement of around 45,000 tons, operating MiG-29K fighter jets and helicopters.
• 2-3 Kolkata-class destroyers (7,500 tons) equipped for air defense and ASW.
• 1-2 Delhi-class destroyers (6,700 tons) providing multi-role capabilities.
• 1-2 Shivalik-class frigates (6,200 tons) focused on ASW and air defense.
• 1 Kilo-class or Scorpène-class submarine (3,000 tons or 1,800 tons respectively) offering ASW capabilities.
• 1 Deepak-class fleet tanker (27,500 tons) responsible for replenishment at sea.

A typical Indian CBG consists of the aircraft carrier, 2-3 destroyers, 1-2 frigates, and 1 submarine.

In addition to these, in East Asia, South Korea and Japan are also enhancing their naval capabilities by developing light aircraft carriers, each forming the centerpiece of their respective carrier groups.

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) is advancing its CVX program, aiming to commission its first light aircraft carrier by the early 2030s. The envisioned carrier group is expected to comprise:

• Aircraft Carrier: The CVX-class carrier, with a length of approximately 265 meters, a beam of 43 meters, and a displacement of around 30,000 to 40,000 tons, designed to operate F-35B fighter jets.
• Destroyers: KDX-III Sejong the Great-class destroyers, each displacing about 10,000 tons, equipped with advanced Aegis combat systems for air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).
• Frigates: Incheon-class frigates, displacing approximately 2,300 tons, providing additional ASW and escort capabilities.
• Submarines: KSS-III Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines, with a displacement of about 3,700 tons, offering undersea warfare and strategic deterrence.
• Support Vessels: Cheonji-class fast combat support ships, displacing around 9,180 tons, responsible for logistics and replenishment at sea.

A typical South Korean light carrier group is anticipated to include the aircraft carrier, 2-3 destroyers, 1-2 frigates, 1 submarine, and 1 support vessel, totaling approximately 6 to 8 ships.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) is converting its Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, also termed multipurpose opertaions destroyers, into light aircraft carriers capable of operating F-35B fighter jets. The typical composition of a Japanese light carrier group includes:

• Aircraft Carrier: Converted Izumo-class vessels, such as JS Izumo and JS Kaga, each featuring an 814-foot-long flight deck and displacing around 27,000 tons.
• Destroyers: Atago-class destroyers, each displacing approximately 10,000 tons, equipped with Aegis combat systems for air and missile defense.
• Frigates: Mogami-class frigates, displacing about 5,500 tons, providing ASW and escort capabilities.
• Submarines: Sōryū-class submarines, with a displacement of approximately 4,200 tons, offering stealth and undersea warfare capabilities.
• Support Vessels: Mashū-class replenishment ships, displacing around 25,000 tons, responsible for providing fuel and supplies to the fleet.

A typical Japanese light carrier group is expected to comprise the aircraft carrier, 2-3 destroyers, 1-2 frigates, 1 submarine, and 1 support vessel, totaling approximately 6 to 8 ships.

These compositions reflect each nation’s strategic emphasis on flexible maritime power projection and enhanced defense capabilities in the Indo-APAC, as well as countering the PLAN’s naval capabilities.

The Case for Light Aircraft Carrier Groups

Full-sized aircraft carriers project formidable power — some observers have called for a fourth Indian aircraft carrier — but come with substantial financial and operational burdens. Light Aircraft Carrier Groups (LACGs) offer a more economical solution without compromising operational effectiveness.

Two notable regional examples that demonstrate light aircraft carrier capabilities are South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Dokdo-class Amphibious Assault Ships:

• Displacement: 19,500 tons
• Length: 199 meters
• Flight deck: 5 landing spots
• Capacity: 15 helicopters
• Well deck: Accommodates 2 Landing Craft Air Cushion vehicles

Japan’s Izumo-class Vessels:

• Displacement: 27,000 tons
• Length: 248 meters
• Originally helicopter destroyers
• Retrofitted to operate F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters
• Capabilities: Air support, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious assault

The Izumo-class transformation, particularly the JS Kaga’s modifications, represents a significant milestone in naval modernization. These vessels exemplify how countries can enhance maritime capabilities through flexible, cost-effective platform design.

It should be noted that both South Korea’s and Japan’s development of “lighting carriers” signal enhanced naval capabilities and strategic ambitions. But they are also unlikely to drastically alter the fundamental balance of power in the most likely maritime flashpoints in the Asia Pacific.  

Turkey’s TCG Anadolu exemplifies the strategic potential of drone integration in naval operations. Originally designed for F-35Bs, the vessel was adapted to deploy unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) after Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, reflecting a innovative approach to naval capability.

The Ukraine-Russia naval conflict in the Black Sea underscores the strategic value of autonomous weapons systems. Ukraine effectively leveraged drone technology to degrade Russian naval power, demonstrating how technological adaptation can offset traditional maritime limitations.

Maritime chokepoints like the Malacca Strait represent critical strategic nodes in global naval operations. These narrow waterways connect major oceanic regions, creating potential vulnerabilities and strategic pressure points that require comprehensive maritime domain awareness and flexible naval strategies. For India, the strategic advantages of LACGs lies in: 

1. Cost-Effectiveness: LACGs require lower capital investment and operational expenditures compared to full-sized carriers. This cost efficiency allows for the acquisition and maintenance of a larger number of vessels, facilitating a more distributed and resilient force posture.
2. Operational Flexibility: The compact size and advanced technology of LACGs enable rapid deployment and versatility across various mission profiles, including disaster response, maritime security, and power projection.
3. Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness: Equipped with advanced sensors and UCAVs, LACGs can significantly improve surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, providing real-time intelligence crucial for informed decision-making.
4. Risk Mitigation: The utilisation of unmanned systems reduces the exposure of personnel to hostile environments, thereby lowering the risk of casualties in high-threat scenarios.

A light aircraft carrier group, centered on an Izumo variant, represents a $7–9 billion USD investment. This includes a carrier, destroyers, frigates, submarines, a fleet tanker, and an air wing, with annual operational costs of $400–600 million and a 30-year lifecycle cost of $19–27 billion USD.

A full aircraft carrier group built around a Vikrant-class analogue — which was built for US$2.5 billion — significantly increases expenses to $12–15 billion USD. With advanced escorts, nuclear submarines, and a larger air wing, annual operational costs reach $900 million–1.2 billion, and the 30-year lifecycle cost escalates to $39–51 billion USD.

For maintaining superiority in the Indian Ocean, India could operate 2-3 light carrier groups for the cost of one full carrier group, offering more flexibility and coverage. A strategy that involves deploying 2-3 light carrier groups and 1-2 full carrier groups for global power projection is a balanced approach. It ensures naval superiority while managing cost efficiency, providing flexible maritime capabilities across regional and international theatres.

Strategic Collaborators

Map of the Indo-Pacific/Indo-Asia Pacific

India and Japan share a commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific and have been strengthening their defense cooperation through initiatives such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and bilateral maritime exercises. Collaborating with Japan to develop LACGs based on the Izumo-class design offers several benefits:

• Technology Transfer: India can leverage Japan’s experience in retrofitting vessels for STOVL operations and integrating advanced systems, accelerating the development of its own LACGs.
• Interoperability: Shared platforms and systems enhance the ability of Indian and Japanese naval forces to operate seamlessly together, bolstering collective security efforts in the region.
• Strategic Deterrence: A combined Indo-Japanese LACG presence in the Indian Ocean serves as a potent counterbalance to the naval ambitions of China and Pakistan, reinforcing regional stability.

Japan’s defense export policies are gradually evolving, with 2014 regulations allowing more flexible defense equipment transfers. By March 2025, planned relaxations could enable exports to countries like India, Australia, and several European and Southeast Asian nations.

India aims to transform its shipbuilding industry, currently representing less than 1% of the global market. The government’s Amrit Kaal Vision 2047 targets positioning India among the top 10 global shipbuilding hubs by 2030 and top 5 by 2047.

Key strategies include:

• Inviting global shipbuilding companies like Hanwha Ocean, Samsung Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, and Mitsui Engineering
• Developing 17 initiatives to boost shipbuilding and ship recycling
• Establishing shipbuilding clusters with technology transfers from Japan and South Korea
• Expanding facilities like Alang Shipyard
• Simplifying customs procedures for importing ship parts

Collaboration with South Korean firms is expected to modernise India’s shipyards, enhance production capabilities, and integrate advanced technologies. This approach mirrors the successful automotive industry partnership between the Indian government and Suzuki in the 1980s.

The evolving defense cooperation between Japan and India, coupled with India’s ambitious shipbuilding goals, creates a promising environment for developing advanced naval assets like Light Aircraft Carrier Groups (LACGs).

Countering Regional Adversaries

China’s expanding naval footprint in the Indian Ocean, exemplified by the establishment of a military base in Djibouti and increased submarine deployments, poses a significant strategic challenge to India’s maritime interests. Similarly, Pakistan’s naval modernisation efforts, including the acquisition of advanced submarines and surface vessels and a focus on asymmetric capabilities, necessitate a robust response from India.

India is comprehensively modernising its naval capabilities through indigenous development and strategic partnerships. The naval expansion plan includes constructing 64 vessels, aiming to grow the fleet to 175 ships by 2035, with recent additions like the INS Vagsheer submarine demonstrating commitment to self-reliance in defense manufacturing.

Strategic regional collaboration focuses on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), involving the United States, Japan, and Australia. Joint exercises and coordinated patrols aim to counterbalance China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific, highlighting India’s proactive maritime security approach.

Operations like “Sankalp,” launched in 2019, exemplify India’s emerging role as a maritime security provider. These initiatives ensure safe transit for Indian-flagged vessels in critical waterways, reinforcing India’s strategic positioning in the Indian Ocean Region.

To counter China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, India is enhancing its naval presence and infrastructure in key locations, including the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep. This includes developing naval bases and improving maritime surveillance to secure critical sea lines of communication.

Through these comprehensive measures, India aims to maintain naval superiority in the Indian Ocean, ensuring regional stability and safeguarding its maritime interests. By modernizing its fleet, strengthening regional partnerships, and asserting a robust maritime presence, India is well-positioned to address the challenges posed by China’s growing influence in the region.

Conclusion

India’s potential adoption of Light Aircraft Carrier Groups (LACGs) represents a pivotal shift in naval doctrine, inspired by Japan’s Izumo-class and South Korea’s Dokdo-class ships. This cost-effective strategy enhances maritime domain awareness, operational flexibility, and regional defense collaboration and synchronsis with ongoing efforts to redefine the modern naval map.  

By integrating advanced unmanned systems, India can amplify maritime surveillance and strike capabilities while minimizing human risk. The proposed strategy involves deploying three LACGs with a balanced composition, including Scorpène-class submarines, enabling power projection and maritime security in the Indian Ocean.

A tri-carrier approach ensures continuous strategic presence: one group actively deployed, one in maintenance, and one mission-ready. This strategy allows India to counter regional competitors, promote maritime stability, and cement its status as a major naval power in the Indian Ocean region.