Last week, the world witnessed a contentious, on-camera Oval Office confrontation between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, U.S. President Donald Trump, and U.S. Vice President JD Vance. What began as a relatively standard exchange quickly escalated into an unprecedented public dispute. Yet when stripped of emotion, these core disagreements have been clear for some time: Must Ukraine accept ending the war no matter the terms, or does it have the ability to influence them? Can it expect any long-term security commitments to guard against future Russian aggression, or does it have no option but to unconditionally halt its operations? And if Kyiv refuses to comply and the United States withdraws support—as the Trump administration has reportedly begun doing this week—can Ukraine survive on its own?

Even before the meeting, the White House had made clear its position: Ukraine has no leverage and therefore no ability to set conditions. Zelensky, of course, has firmly rejected this conclusion. For Ukrainians, ending the war is undoubtedly a welcome goal. And after three years of brutal fighting, previous strategies—including those pursued by prior administrations—have failed to open a clear path to peace. While Western assistance has been crucial to Ukraine’s survival, restrictions on the range and use of weapons have led to an infantry-centric war of attrition that has severely strained Ukrainian forces and offered no clear route to victory.

Yet Russia, too, has failed to achieve its objectives or to find a clear route to victory. Although its forces have made steady territorial gains through 2024 and the first months of 2025, its progress has been gruelingly slow and extremely costly, leaving it with few viable options for dramatically altering the situation in its favor. It is thus dismaying that the U.S. government has at times echoed Russian narratives—propaganda meant to distort perceptions of the war. This has led many in Kyiv, Washington, and other capitals to worry that U.S. policy could inadvertently offer a lifeline to the struggling aggressor in this war.

What is especially unfortunate about this risk is that Washington has the capacity to exert significant pressure on the Kremlin at the moment, potentially pushing it to accept reasonable terms for an armistice in the coming months. Kyiv has consistently expressed its interest in ending the war and achieving peace—but only under the right conditions. Today, Ukraine proposed a staged approach to a cease-fire, starting with an end to air and maritime hostilities. But a complete cease-fire forced on Ukraine at any necessary cost will not bring a sustainable end to the war—the prospect that was hinted at in the Oval Office confrontation, reflecting a preference for a bilateral U.S.-Russian agreement with which Ukraine is expected to simply comply.

Such an approach would reflect a fundamentally flawed understanding of the current balance of power in the war, making it both shortsighted and strategically unsound. It raises the risk of the worst possible scenario—not only failing to secure a lasting resolution but also setting the stage for the continuation of the war. Demanding unconditional acceptance of the terms pushed on Ukraine would mean that it would come on terms written in Moscow—for Ukraine, making it effectively capitulation. Kyiv would face a stark choice: capitulation or continuing to fight without its key ally. Yet the Ukrainian leadership, with the overwhelming support of the Ukrainian people, long ago decided that surrender was not an option, a commitment reinforced by the experience of the occupied territories: everywhere Russia has prevailed, terror, lawlessness, and destruction have followed.

Ukraine would thus be forced to brace itself for war without U.S. support. In any case, a withdrawal of that support might in the long run be the outcome of either path presented to Zelensky at the White House: accepting an effectively unconditional cease-fire without security guarantees, or losing U.S. military assistance immediately.

But even as the U.S. pauses military aid, Ukraine’s war effort will not suddenly collapse despite the significant challenges a prolonged freeze would impose. As long as strong European support continues, which seems even more likely after this week’s gathering of leaders from the continent in London, Putin will be able to achieve some tactical breakthroughs but will not reach his maximalist objectives. A U.S. government aligning with Russia in ways that actively undermine Ukraine’s fight would be a truly shocking development—one that would shatter trust in the United States and irreparably fracture the Western alliance. But Ukrainians, who know the awful cost of this war better than anyone, have no choice but to fight for their country’s survival.

FALLING SHORT

By almost any standard, and especially given its original plans, Russia has dramatically underachieved in three years of war. When Putin realized in 2022 that a quick conquest of Ukraine would not be possible, he scaled back to a more limited set of operational objectives: fully occupying the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, maintaining the land bridge to Crimea through southern Ukraine, destroying Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and military assets, enforcing a Black Sea blockade to strangle the Ukrainian economy. Even these objectives have mostly not been met. Ukrainian naval forces reopened the Black Sea and restored shipping routes. Despite relentless missile and drone attacks on both energy infrastructure and civilian centers, Ukraine still has power, and its people remain resilient. And Russia has still not fully claimed the Donbas. It has lost 900,000 personnel and 100,000 major weapons systems—ships, planes, helicopters, tanks, rocket launchers, artillery. In 2024, Russia managed to conquer less than an additional one percent of Ukrainian territory; this year, its progress has slowed considerably.

At the moment, Russia’s troops are exhausted, its defense production is struggling to keep pace with battlefield losses, and its unmanned weapon systems are, despite great effort on Moscow’s part, struggling to prevail over those of Ukraine. Unexploded drones and missiles recovered from the battlefield are mostly of very recent manufacture, indicating that Russia has depleted much of its stockpile and is deploying new weapons as soon they become available. Meanwhile, even with Russia’s large population (and soldiers from North Korea), recruitment levels are failing to meet demand, and the high casualty rate leaves little time for adequate training of new troops.

Ukraine faces plenty of challenges of its own. While Russia has failed to establish full air dominance, it still controls the airspace near the frontlines (in part because Ukraine has not been given advanced modern aircraft), allowing it to launch hundreds of guided aerial bombs, along with drones and missiles, at Ukrainian forces and defense and civilian infrastructure, exacerbating both military and economic strains. And manpower has indeed been, as Vance repeatedly emphasized, a serious problem, in part because restrictions on allied assistance (especially on airpower and long-range strikes) necessitated continued reliance on infantry mobilization and trench warfare. Ukraine has suffered over 43,000 killed in action and many more wounded, a toll made worse by shortages of equipment, ammunition, and spare parts; although recruitment for unmanned-aerial-vehicle and other high-end brigades has continued apace, meeting needs for the most dangerous, grueling infantry deployments has been a well-known struggle.

Yet even with these challenges, Ukraine has more than proved its ability to forestall major Russian advances, in part through its embrace and refinement of new warfighting methods. Drones and other unmanned systems have played an especially important role, taking on tasks typically performed by far more sophisticated air and maritime assets. Successful aerial and naval interdiction operations have kept a significant portion of Russian forces tied down away from the frontlines, coastal areas, and key trading routes. Meanwhile, enhanced support from Europe would allow Ukraine to reduce its reliance on infantry personnel and build its own robust and adaptable defense capabilities. And an ongoing shift to more technology-driven operations—including those based on a “drone line” concept that will help prevent Russian forces from approaching the frontline—can help allay manpower issues.

Given the current situation on the battlefield, Ukraine can continue to thwart the objectives of Russian President Vladimir Putin, restricting his forces to slow and costly progress along current frontlines. And more support from Europe could, this year or next, allow Ukrainian forces to stop and even reverse this momentum. In short, Ukraine is not losing the war today, nor will it in the future, despite Russia’s size and considerable advantage in resources.

TRUCE AND CONSEQUENCES

The only way to bring Russia into serious negotiations, or to compel it to halt its aggression and accept a de facto cease-fire, would be to present it with severe consequences for continuing the war. Washington has several points of leverage. It can tighten and better enforce sanctions, putting acute pressure on a Russian economy that, despite the Kremlin’s efforts to promote an image of stability, is already under severe strain, with an estimated 40 percent of public spending going to the war. It can increase military pressure by giving Ukraine previously withheld weapons, removing restrictions on their use, and providing enhanced real-time intelligence. Russia has demonstrated an extraordinary tolerance for casualties, making attrition alone an unreliable strategy for forcing a resolution. But historical evidence suggests that battlefield setbacks rather than human losses have been the primary factor shaping Russia’s perception of success or failure.

A series of territorial losses, even of relatively small areas, could cause Putin to reconsider his strategy and seek an end to the war. If offensive operations visibly fail, and Ukrainian forces successfully regain even small portions of occupied territory, the Kremlin will worry about further territorial losses. Even a partial defeat would be a terrible prospect from Putin’s perspective, fueling his fears of regime weakness and losing control. Under such pressure, it would be far less risky for Moscow to de-escalate and attempt to minimize the damage. Even the credible prospect of such a scenario—driven by a policy of unwavering support for Ukraine—could be enough to push Russia toward reconsidering its war effort.

If a cease-fire were reached, deterring a renewed Russian offensive would become essential. The only way to prevent another military campaign as soon as Moscow thought it could gain an advantage would be to ensure that it would face a credible prospect of ultimate defeat. Such “deterrence by denial” could be most easily achieved, of course, by making Ukraine a member of NATO; but it can also be done by building a Ukrainian force capable of decisively repelling a Russian attack.

Military planners and analysts are already working on the design of this future force. Some European countries have expressed a willingness to support Ukraine with troops as peacekeepers or as backup forces. But their rules of engagement must be clearly defined, and it is vital that they have the authority to intervene in case of an emergency. Although Europe should be able to provide necessary funding for deterrence, and key leaders have indicated they are willing to do so, Washington would need to provide access to some specific capabilities (including air defense systems, support for missile targeting systems, real-time intelligence, and certain parts and ammunition).

A HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT?

The Trump administration seems to believe that Russia would agree to halt its aggression and end the war without new pressure or Ukrainian capitulation. Yet even if Ukraine were to accept a settlement on Russian terms, it would not lead to genuine peace. Zelensky’s consistent demand for security guarantees alongside a cease-fire should not be dismissed as just a political stance—it is based on the real risk that Russia would use any pause in hostilities to prepare for its next offensive. A perceived victory would reinforce Putin’s ambitions, and an operational pause would give him a chance to regroup. Russia would be able to accumulate a critical mass of capabilities and prepare for a new large-scale strike. This offensive would be even more dangerous than the invasion that began on February 24, 2022: Russia would be more prepared to suppress air defenses, control airspace, and disrupt critical infrastructure, and it would likely avoid repeating the mistake of spreading its forces too thin.

The consequences of an assault by a rearmed, recovered Russia would be devasting for Ukraine, which without firm security support might not be adequately prepared to withstand it. The mere worry about such a scenario would be an enormous drag on Ukraine’s economic recovery and postwar reconstruction. And the idea that a negotiation over security arrangements can come after a cease-fire is misguided: it would give the Kremlin leverage to stall or block any proposal by threatening the cease-fire, playing on Western reluctance to restart the war.

Russia’s immediate objectives are clear: legitimizing its occupation, avoiding accountability for war crimes, evading economic collapse, exerting influence over Ukraine’s security arrangements. Meanwhile, its long-term strategic goals remain unchanged: to subjugate Ukraine, weaken the Western security architecture, and establish a multipolar world dominated by a handful of powerful nations. A deal with the Trump administration that sidelines Ukraine would hasten both Russian short-term and long-term objectives while validating aggression as a legitimate strategy. If Putin emerges victorious after standing on the brink of failure solely because of a sudden shift in U.S. policy, it will reshape global security in dangerous ways.

That would be all the more lamentable because the United States has an opportunity to steer events in a much more positive direction—exerting pressure on Russia to end the war and to secure a fair settlement that protects Ukraine’s long-term security. A useful parallel is the experience of South Korea, which, thanks to long-term U.S. military and economic support, has been able build its own defense capabilities and deter North Korea. A similar outcome in Ukraine—a well-prepared armistice supported by credible security arrangements—could bring sustained peace and stability. If executed correctly, this would be a truly historic achievement.

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