In late January, barely a week into Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president, a senior NATO official told members of the European Parliament that Russia’s intensifying use of hybrid warfare poses a major threat to the West. In the hearing, James Appathurai, NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for innovation, hybrid, and cyber, described “incidents of sabotage taking place across NATO countries over a period of the last couple of years,” including train derailments, arson, attacks on infrastructure, and even assassination plots against leading industrialists. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, sabotage operations linked to Russian intelligence have been recorded in 15 countries. Speaking to the press after the January hearing, Appathurai said it was time for NATO to move to a “war footing” to deal with these escalating attacks.
In the weeks since then, Trump’s dramatic overtures to Putin have pushed the sabotage campaign into the background. Instead, in aiming to quickly secure a deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, the Trump administration has talked of a new era of relations between Washington and Moscow. At the same time, the White House has taken steps to dismantle efforts within the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security to counter cyberwarfare, disinformation, and election interference against the United States—all of which have previously been tied to Moscow. Indeed, Trump has suggested that Russia can be trusted to uphold any peace deal and that Putin is “going to be more generous than he has to be.”
But any assumption that a Trump-Putin deal will cause the Kremlin’s spies and saboteurs to step back is dangerously mistaken. For one thing, their political masters would not allow it. Very few in Moscow’s security establishment believe that a durable peace can be achieved with the United States or the broader West. In February, Fyodor Lukyanov, head of research at the Valdai Club, a pro-Kremlin think tank, said that there was no chance for a “second Yalta”—a global deal that would redefine the borders and spheres of influence in Europe. And Dmitry Suslov, another prominent voice of Kremlin foreign policy, has said that any thaw in U.S.-Russian relations would be short-lived and unlikely to survive the U.S. midterm elections in 2026.
At the same time, in Russia’s security services, mistrust of American intentions runs deep. For centuries, Russia has viewed the West as intent on Russia’s subjugation or outright destruction, and Soviet and Russian intelligence services have operated for decades on the assumption that the West is an implacable foe. To Moscow’s spies, Trump’s courting of Putin has provided an opportunity to expand and strengthen their subversion campaign in Europe. Given the Trump administration’s skepticism toward NATO and the defense of its transatlantic allies, a U.S.-Russian agreement could increase Moscow’s willingness to launch unconventional attacks in Europe.
After three years of full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia’s spy agencies are now fully mobilized in Europe and have built sabotage and hybrid warfare into a comprehensive strategy. These attacks are not merely designed to keep European governments off-kilter. They are also aimed at diminishing Europeans’ support for Ukraine by raising costs on the governments and industries in ways that are not easy to counter, harassing the population, and seeking vulnerabilities in European defense. Unless the West is prepared to come up with a cohesive strategy to counter those attacks with a signal strong enough to serve as an effective deterrent, Moscow will see few downsides to accelerating this campaign in any post-deal future.
MOSCOW’S NEW KILLERS
Ever since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Moscow’s spy agencies have been experimenting with sabotage operations abroad as a way to pressure the West. At first, this included occasional attacks, such as the blowing up, by agents of Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency, of ammunition depots in the Czech Republic that had been supplying Ukrainian forces then fighting Russia in the Donbas. After its 2022 invasion of Ukraine stalled, Moscow was at first cut off from the West, with its diplomats expelled and its spies forced to regroup. But in 2023, its intelligence services, including the Federal Security Service, or FSB, the Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR, and the GRU, began redeploying in Europe in what became a new kind of hybrid warfare campaign.
So far, the most brazen operation was Russia’s attempted assassination in the spring of 2024 of Armin Papperger, the head of Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest arms manufacturer. The plot was thwarted by German and American intelligence services, as Appathurai, the NATO hybrid warfare official, publicly confirmed in January. In his testimony, Appathurai noted that there have been “other plots” against European industry leaders, as well. This threat seems unlikely to go away: notably, along with other European defense companies, Rheinmetall is likely to play an even larger role in arming Ukraine in a post-deal future, and its growth projections have surged since the Trump administration has come to power.
In his January testimony, Appathurai also confirmed that Russia has been recruiting “criminal gangs or unwitting youth or migrants” to conduct many of these operations. In March 2024, for example, two British men were arrested for setting fire to a Ukrainian-linked parcel delivery warehouse in east London—an attack that was connected to the Wagner paramilitary company, traditionally a front for the Russian military intelligence agency. One reason for this is that local criminals could be recruited via social media for one-off jobs without even knowing who they are working for, making it more difficult to counter, and it became harder to infiltrate Russian nationals into these countries.
In addition to targeting European infrastructure and military logistics, Moscow’s spy agencies may also be seeking to use sabotage operations to influence the political landscape in target countries. In the run-up to Germany’s federal election in February, for example, there was a series of attacks against civilians in Germany by Afghans and other immigrants. According to a senior German intelligence official we spoke to shortly before the election, the German agencies believed that Russian security agents may have instigated these attacks in order to inflate support for the far right, which opposes German support for Ukraine.
These attacks don’t necessarily have to be violent to be effective. For example, there are indications that Russian agencies could use social media to recruit teenagers, including those belonging to post-Soviet diasporas, to spray hateful slogans on the walls of apartment buildings in neighborhoods with a significant migrant population, threatening or humiliating locals to incite hatred against refugees from Ukraine or Syria. These attacks don’t require much preparation and may cost only a few thousand dollars. More ambitious recruits might be paid to undertake more violent actions, such as committing arson or throwing Molotov cocktails.
European intelligence officials believe that Germany, along with Poland and the United Kingdom, will remain one of Moscow’s primary targets. Given the country’s large immigrant population from former Soviet republics, including Russia and Ukraine, and the rising tensions about immigration, Russia’s spy agencies may see particular potential for influencing the political situation and public opinion. Moreover, in view of incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s commitment to dramatically increase German defense spending and its role in Western security, the Kremlin may have even greater incentive to try to destabilize the country.
HOSTAGE GAMES
Another element of Russia’s emerging strategy is its growing use of hostages. Never before have foreigners with European and American passports been seized as extensively in Russia as they are now. Since the start of the invasion, Russia’s Federal Security Service has begun arresting numerous citizens of target countries under various pretexts—such as discovering a piece of gum with cannabis in a purse or finding a donation of a few hundred dollars to a Ukrainian charity on the detainee’s smartphone.
During the Cold War, the business of prisoner swaps was mostly limited to quiet exchanges between rival Western and Soviet spy agencies that happened on the sidelines of geopolitics. For instance, the KGB did not bring spy swaps to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Since the war in Ukraine began, that has changed. Following the negotiations over the release of the detained American basketball star Brittney Griner, Russian intelligence agencies—especially the SVR and the FSB—have recognized that hostage trades can powerfully affect public opinion in target countries. As a result, Moscow has turned captured foreigners, including from France and Germany as well as the United States, into a substantial form of leverage in geopolitical negotiations.
Now, the role of Russia’s spy agencies in capturing and trading hostages is becoming institutionalized. The FSB emerged as a backchannel between the United States and Russia several years ago, so it is no surprise that it played a major role in talks for the release of the American journalist Evan Gershkovich in 2024. Indeed, Sergei Naryshkin, the head of the SVR, has been involved in such negotiations with Washington for quite some time, including in 2022, when then CIA director William Burns met Naryshkin in Ankara. Among the items on the agenda for that meeting, alongside the use of nuclear weapons, was the issue of U.S. prisoners in Russia.
More recently, when Kremlin officials held preliminary talks with Trump administration officials in Riyadh about a Ukraine deal, Naryshkin was included on the Russian side, presumably, among other things, to make use of the hostage issue. Notably, those talks were preceded by the release of the American teacher Marc Fogel, who had been detained in Russia for possessing medical cannabis; in a public ceremony, Trump touted Fogel’s return and greeted him at the White House. Indeed, hostage swaps draw on some of the quid-pro-quo dynamics that Trump prefers in his approach to dealmaking, making it all the more likely that Russia will continue to accumulate Western prisoners. On March 11, Naryshkin had his first phone conversation with Trump’s CIA director, John Ratliff, and according to Russia’s state news agency, TASS, the two agreed to “maintain a regular contact.”
MORE DARKNESS, MORE DECEPTION
Since 2022, Russia’s intelligence agencies have also linked the sabotage option firmly with their more long-standing campaign of transnational repression. The Kremlin has a long tradition of using various tools against its enemies and opposition members in exile, often in the same countries where it is now practicing sabotage, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic countries. Russia’s secret police may have the dubious honor of having invented transnational repression: beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, tsarist secret police infiltrated and harassed Russian political émigrés in France and Switzerland. Their Soviet successors significantly escalated those tactics, up to and including political assassinations. Since the early years of this century, Putin’s spies have done the same, attacking opposition figures who have sought refuge abroad.
But now Russia’s transnational repression is becoming more sophisticated and often involves efforts to deflect blame toward other parties. In early February, for example, the SVR publicly accused Ukraine’s intelligence agencies of “preparing attacks” against Russian opposition or business figures who have sought refuge abroad. The SVR asserted that the would-be attackers, in the event of arrest, would “blame the Russian special services, allegedly on whose orders these attacks were prepared.”
The Russian exile communities across Europe quickly grasped the significance of this announcement: the SVR was laying the groundwork for a new round of attacks on Russian exiles, with the blame being placed on Ukraine in advance. Moscow’s practice of blaming Ukraine for Russian operations in the West seems only likely to expand. From now on, these attacks, including assassination attempts, arson, and attacks on infrastructure, will likely be blamed on Ukrainian intelligence in an effort to turn European public opinion against Ukraine.
Most of the sabotage operations lack direct traces to Russia.
These efforts suggest a change in Russian strategy. For several years after 2016, Moscow’s intelligence agents seemed to be increasingly brazen and sloppy, as if they did not really care about being exposed or caught. Consider the Russian assassin on a bicycle who shot a Chechen separatist in the center of Berlin in broad daylight and was almost immediately arrested by German police while he was dumping his pistol and his bike in the nearby river Spree. To some extent, Russian operatives like him didn’t care: they were determined to show, by their brazen actions, that Western efforts to expose and criminally charge them were not working.
Now, however, the spy agencies are switching back to a more secretive mode. The war in Ukraine has made it harder for Russians to set up their own operations in Europe, and the recent changes in spy tradecraft—such as outsourcing operations to European nationals for one-off jobs, out of the established spy networks in the target countries—have helped them get around this.
In his notes he had smuggled from Moscow, the KGB archivist and defector Vasili Mitrokhin described the Soviets’ meticulous preparations in the 1960s for a sabotage attack on the NATO Integrated Air Defense site on Mount Parnitha, near Athens. The chosen method for disabling it was arson using technical devices developed by the KGB’s “F” Service laboratory. These devices were disguised as Greek-style cigarette packs, containing highly flammable charges that could be ignited at any time using built-in mechanisms, accounting for the rarefied air. The operation would require, of course, several highly trained special forces operators. If this attack ever took place, it would have been difficult not to attribute it to a hostile state.
This was the same model used by Putin during his early years in power. In the first decade of this century, when Russian spy agencies carried out assassinations abroad, those attacks had an obvious Russian state signature, as when the attackers used polonium, or the military-grade nerve agent Novichok. But this is no longer the case. Most of the sabotage operations the Kremlin has launched over the past two years lack direct traces to Russia. Many also involve local perpetrators who have been recruited via social media for one-off jobs for a few hundred dollars.
EYE OFF THE BALL
Despite overwhelming evidence that the Kremlin has developed a systematic and increasingly lethal hybrid warfare strategy, Western leaders have failed to devise an adequate strategy for containing it. For now, the naming and shaming tactics that the United States and its European allies adopted after Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. election remain a significant part of the Western response.
In November 2024, a London court put on trial a group of Bulgarians who had been charged with spying for Russian agencies—including surveilling the U.S. military base in Stuttgart where the Ukrainian military was believed to be trained, planning an attack at the Kazakh embassy in London, and attacking two investigative journalists opposing the Kremlin, as well as a Kazakh politician in exile in London. In early March, the defendants were all found guilty in what has become a larger effort to expose and punish those who collude with Moscow. Some European countries also seem to be attempting to reduce the effect of sabotage attacks carried out by Russian agents, by denying or downplaying their scale.
More promising are recent efforts to double down on security. Several European countries, for example, have taken new measures to protect telecommunications cables, pipelines, and other critical infrastructure in the Baltics, near Russia. This includes the launch in January of a British-led reaction system to track potential threats to undersea infrastructure and to monitor the Russian shadow fleet—aging and poorly maintained vessels operating with flags of convenience and murky ownership and management—as part of the ten-nation-strong Joint Expeditionary Force.
But the turmoil within the U.S. intelligence community caused by Trump’s reorientation toward Moscow has made it more difficult to shape a comprehensive Western response. Public reports of the Trump administration’s buyout offers to members of the CIA have been met with glee in Russia. Meanwhile, the administration has set new priorities for U.S. intelligence—including targeting drug cartels in Mexico and focusing more on China—rather than on Russia and support for Ukraine. For Moscow’s spy agencies, these moves could be exploited as opportunities to increase their activities in the West.
If Trump’s moves lead to a dramatic decline in surveilling Russia, it will not be the first time the U.S. intelligence community will have taken its eye off the ball. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, there was a similar shift in attention away from Russia, one that resulted in a significant loss of expertise in Russian affairs and underestimation of risks on the part of Washington. This intelligence decline very likely contributed to the West’s misjudging of Putin during his early years in power, when he laid the foundations for renewed Russian autocracy and confrontation with Europe and the United States. It would be disastrous to repeat the same mistake today.
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